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BITING THE D.V. BULLET: ARE DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE
RESTRAINING ORDERS TRAMPLING ON SECOND
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
Peter Slocum
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2005, Colleen Nestler convinced a New Mexico
court to file a restraining order against David Letterman because she
1
claimed that his presence on television harassed her. Although the
2
issuing court later dismissed its own outrageous protective order, Mr.
3
Letterman was placed on a national register of domestic abusers. He
was prohibited from either directly or indirectly contacting the alleged victim (whom he had never met) and would have been subject
4
to criminal prosecution for any violation. Federal law required the
5
television host to forfeit any firearms that he may have owned. If he
had come into possession of a weapon while this order was still out6
standing, he could have gone to prison.
While many people consider domestic-violence restraining orders important tools for combating abuse, the above example illustrates that they may be subject to inappropriate applications. This
Comment examines the implications of the Second Amendment to
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Rutgers
University. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy, Jamie Gottlieb, and Ashley
Ochs for their invaluable guidance and assistance with the development of this
Comment.
1
Gregory A. Hession, Restraining Orders Out of Control, NEW AM., Aug. 4, 2008, at
12, 12, available at http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/173-restrainingorders-out-of-control. David Letterman is a late-night television-show host. Id.
2
Id. at 13.
3
Id. at 12. The register is the Protection Order File of the National Criminal
Information Center, which is maintained by the Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
NCIC National Crime Information Center, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/
ncic_brochure.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
4
Hession, supra note 1, at 12.
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).
6
See id. § 924(a)(1) (providing that violation of § 922(g) is punishable by up to
five years in prison).
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the U.S. Constitution in state domestic-violence restraining orders.
7
Focusing on the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,
this Comment argues that because of the laxity of the statute, the potential for abuse by plaintiffs, and the expansive provisions limiting
gun ownership, the current law is overbroad and thereby infringes on
8
defendants’ right to bear arms.
In June of 2008, a New Jersey Chancery Division judge found
that the state’s domestic-violence statute violated both the state and
9
federal constitutions in Crespo v. Crespo. Although the defendant had
argued that the statute also violated his Second Amendment rights,
the judge rejected this argument because no protection for weapon
10
ownership exists in New Jersey. Less than two weeks later, the Supreme Court of the United States declared in District of Columbia v.
Heller that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to
bear arms and thereby rejected the longstanding “militia right”
11
theory. This landmark decision will no doubt lead to renewed scrutiny of many laws, both at the state and federal level. Domesticviolence legislation is a prime example of statutes that require such
analysis.
Part II of this Comment explains how state domestic-violence
laws implicate the Second Amendment and ultimately assumes incorporation of the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment. It provides a general background on the customary features of state restraining-order statutes as they exist across the country. It then focuses specifically on New Jersey’s domestic-violence statute and sets forth detailed background information on the law along
with specific precedent as to how the courts have interpreted the statute. Part II then examines how the state’s statute interacts with oth-

7

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 to -34 (West 2005).
See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
9
Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
June 18, 2008), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/crespo_decision.pdf
(finding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers rules set forth in the New
Jersey Constitution as well as the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution), rev’d,
972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2009).
10
Id. at 11; see also Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968). New Jersey is
one of only seven states that does not provide for gun-ownership rights in its state
constitution. Roland H. Beason, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It Is Time to
Protect the Right of the Individual to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 561, 580 (1999)
(citing David B. Kopel, Rational Basis of “Assault Weapon” Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L.
381, 382 (1994)).
11
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008); see also infra Part II.A.
8

SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

5/20/2010 4:56 PM

COMMENT

641

er laws, both at the state and at the federal level. Last, it looks at how
courts apply the statute in practice and the sorts of external factors
that play a role in the administration of the law.
Part III analyzes New Jersey’s statute in light of Heller. It concludes that a “rational basis” review for Second Amendment challenges is unlikely and assumes an “intermediate scrutiny” review as
the lowest plausible standard. This Part then applies that standard of
review to New Jersey’s statute and concludes that it would fail a constitutional challenge for being overly broad. Finally, Part IV recommends revisions to New Jersey’s statute so that the needs of victims of
domestic violence can be balanced properly against the constitutional
rights of defendants. This Comment proposes five specific alterations
and discusses how each would make the law less vulnerable to Second
Amendment criticism while still affording victims of domestic violence ample legal protection.
II. LAWS AFFECTING THE FIREARMS RIGHTS OF
DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE DEFENDANTS
New Jersey passed the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of
12
1991 to address the problem of violence in domestic relations.
Since that time, numerous laws have emerged, at both the state and
federal level, which create an intricate web of legislation that simultaneously creates tempting causes of action for plaintiffs and provides
13
stiff penalties for defendants. To properly analyze the constitutionality of New Jersey’s statute, it is necessary to set forth the law in this
area generally so as to see the interplay that exists.
A. Implication of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
“[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in14
fringed.” For most of the past century, lower courts had interpreted
the amendment as referring to a collective right held by the militias
15
of the several states, thereby excluding individuals from the concept

12

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005).
See infra Part II.C.2.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
15
See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d
1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
13
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of “the people” as used in the Second Amendment. While some low16
er courts concluded otherwise, the consensus among the majority of
the circuits and states (at least among those that had taken part in the
17
analysis) was that individuals had no right to bear arms. In a 2008
decision, District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court reversed
that longstanding interpretation and declared that the Second
18
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms. As the particular law that the Court was analyzing was not from a state but rather from the District of Columbia, the Court had no need to consider the issue of incorporation of the Second Amendment against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Currently, the courts have yet to incorporate against the states
only four of the liberties protected by the first eight amendments in
the Bill of Rights: the restriction on quartering soldiers, the right to a
civil jury, the right to a grand jury, and the Second Amendment’s
19
right to bear arms. Courts that had previously addressed the possible incorporation of the Second Amendment did so under the guise
of the “militia right” theory and found that incorporation was unne20
cessary for a freedom that did not concern individual liberties. Because of the dramatic shift in the basic understanding of this protected right after Heller, however, those older cases will likely be of
little, if any, precedential value to future courts. Indeed, some lower
courts have already decided to incorporate the Second Amendment
21
in the wake of Heller.
In NRA v. City of Chicago, decided after Heller, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of whether to
incorporate the Second Amendment against the states through the
22
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh
Circuit declined to incorporate the right to bear arms and stated that
23
the issue was “for the Justices rather than a court of appeals.” The

16

See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
19
Beason, supra note 10, at 571–72.
20
See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
21
See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 575
F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
22
567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009).
23
Id. at 860.
17
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Supreme Court accepted the petition for certiorari in this case, and a
24
decision is still pending as this Comment goes to print.
The five-Justice majority that decided Heller is still on the Court
25
at the time of this publication. These are the same Justices who
stated, “By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had be26
come fundamental for English subjects.” Whether a given right is
“fundamental—whether, that is, [it] is necessary to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty” has been cited by the Court as
27
one basis on which to incorporate a constitutional right.
This
Comment thus subscribes to the view that incorporation is appropri28
ate but will go no further to make arguments in this regard. Accordingly, this Comment assumes incorporation and proceeds with an
analysis of domestic-violence restraining orders in light of Second
29
Amendment rights.

24

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
26
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008).
27
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial). A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently cited this exact language in deciding that the Second Amendment should be
incorporated against the states. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently ordered an en banc rehearing of the case. Nordyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
28
For a specific argument as to why the courts should incorporate the Second
Amendment against the states, see generally Beason, supra note 10. For a discussion
on incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
29
Notably, incorporation, while being the most direct way of attacking the validity of state restraining orders under the Second Amendment, is not the only way of
implicating federal constitutional protections against state orders. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006) prohibits individuals with state restraining orders filed
against them from possessing firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce.
Some courts have already discussed Second Amendment issues with regard to state
orders through this federal statute. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,
261–62 (5th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the federal Prevention of Violence Against
Women Act requires all states and federal territories to give full faith and credit to all
provisions of restraining orders issued by the states. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2006). Thus a
state restraining order prohibiting a defendant from owning a firearm in the District
of Columbia might implicate the Second Amendment. This Comment does not address alternative scenarios, however, because it assumes incorporation.
25
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B. Restraining Orders in the States
All fifty states have their own domestic-violence statutes and each
permits the filing of restraining orders against the alleged abuser by
30
the plaintiff-victim. While each law is unique, many features are
common to all such statutes.
As a general matter, the plaintiff-victim files with the court a petition for relief alleging that the defendant committed acts of domes31
tic abuse. An affidavit or other sworn statement accompanies the
32
petition. In the majority of jurisdictions, these statutes permit the
judge to enter an emergency protective order ex parte the very same
day without the defendant even being aware that proceedings are
33
happening. After the defendant receives notice, the court will hold
a summary hearing within a few days or weeks to decide whether to
34
make the restraining order final. At the hearing the plaintiff nor30

See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL
PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
domviol/docs/DV_CPO_Chart_8_2007.pdf. For a basic discussion on the policy arguments underlying civil restraining orders, see generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women
and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657.
For a discussion specific to New Jersey’s statute, see generally Maura Beth Johnson,
Note, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 17
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234 (1993).
31
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(a) (West, Westlaw through 2009);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1) (LEXIS through 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2950(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3
(LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.).
32
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.020 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.710(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (LEXIS through 2009 Special Sess. I); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21103(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).
33
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(5)(a) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4(2) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D)(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2009, file 17 of the 128th Gen. Assem.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-4
(LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-6 (Westlaw
through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. Rule 09-09). South Carolina is unique in that it
provides for emergency hearings but does not provide for ex parte relief. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-50 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.).
34
Maryland’s statute provides for the shortest return period of two days or fewer.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504.1(e)(1)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg.
Sess.). Nevada’s statute provides for among the longest return periods of forty-five
days after the date of the application for an extended order. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33.020(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 74th Reg. Sess. & 25th Special Sess.). For
the remaining states, two weeks is the approximate norm. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-56(a) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Special Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
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mally bears the burden of proving the allegations in the petition by a
35
preponderance of the evidence. If a final restraining order issues, it
36
will normally be limited to a specified period, but some states allow
37
the judge to make the restraining order permanent. States that do
put a time limit on these protective orders generally allow extensions
38
upon request by the plaintiff and after a hearing. Final restraining
orders are normally subject to modification by either party after peti39
tion to the court and a hearing.
Some features of certain states’ statutes are quite unique, however. For example, Arizona’s statute provides that at an ex parte hearing, the court may enter a restraining order against the defendant if
the court has “reasonable cause to believe . . . [that t]he defendant
40
has committed an act of domestic violence” or even if the court has
“reasonable cause to believe . . . [that t]he defendant may commit an

6308(5) (LEXIS through 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.050 (West, Westlaw
through 2009 legislation).
35
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(c) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/205(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(1) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of 124th Leg.);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 3d Extraordinary
Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct.
Rule 09-09); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(b) (LEXIS through 2009–2010 1st Sess. of
Gen. Assem. & 2009 Special Sess.).
36
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(b) (1999) (providing that term may not
exceed one year); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (West, Westlaw though 2009 legislation) (stating that term may not exceed three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5
(Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. Rule 09-09) (dictating that term may
not exceed five years).
37
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b)(1) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. &
1st Special Sess. of 26th Leg.) (providing no time limit for some provisions of protective orders); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(c) (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15204(1) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (stating that the order may be permanent); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on
restraining orders).
38
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(c)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(F) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West, Westlaw through ch. 19 of 2010 2d Annual Sess.); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).
39
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2004 &Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(13) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:5(VII)(b) (Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-27-501(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 4th Extraordinary Sess.).
40
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E)(2) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 5th
Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)).
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41

act of domestic violence.” An ex parte order issued after such a
hearing is more akin to a final restraining order than a temporary
42
one. If the defendant wants the opportunity to be heard, the de43
fendant must petition the court to obtain a hearing. Colorado’s statute similarly inverts the standard procedures. That statute provides
that after the court issues an ex parte order, the defendant must “appear before the court at a specific time and date and . . . show cause,
if any, why said temporary civil protection order should not be made
44
permanent.” This process of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant is not unique to Colorado; Hawaii similarly requires the de45
fendant to prove his own innocence.
Other states have interesting features in their statutes as well.
For example, in Hawaii, a temporary restraining order prevents contact with the plaintiff not only by the defendant but also by the de46
fendant’s attorney. Hawaii’s statute contains another provision whereby the court, if it finds that the defendant has violated a restraining
order, may require a global positioning satellite tracking device to be
47
affixed to the defendant’s person. The court may order the defen48
dant to pay for the related costs. Furthermore, in Colorado, the
underlying domestic violence that the protection-order statute ad41

§ 13-3602(E)(1) (emphasis added).
Compare § 13-3602(G) (listing the relief available to the plaintiff after the ex
parte hearing), with § 13-3602(L) (stating that the order is effective for one year after
being served on the defendant), and § 13-3602(I) (stating that the defendant must
petition the court to obtain a hearing on the matter).
43
§ 13-3602(I). For similar provisions in other state statutes, see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01(5)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-925(4) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 101st Leg. 1st Special Sess.); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.718(11) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.).
44
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(5) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of
67th Gen. Assem.).
45
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-5(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 2d
Special Sess.) (stating that the court “shall hold a hearing on the application requiring cause to be shown why the order should not continue”).
46
See id. § 586-4(c); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (limiting
such communications when a party has counsel but not when she is representing
herself pro se). This communication ban would likely hinder any efforts to arrive at
an amicable property settlement agreement in a situation where the parties are seeking a divorce.
47
§ 586-4(e) (pertaining to violations of temporary restraining orders); id. § 58611(a) (pertaining to violation of final restraining orders). For similar provisions, see
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2143 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
48
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 586-4(e), -11(a) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 2d
Special Sess.).
42
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dresses encompasses not only physical actions and verbal threats but
49
also acts of financial, document, and property control.
States deal with the issue of gun ownership in relation to restraining orders in a variety of ways. Approximately half of the state
statutes do not specifically address whether the judge may order the
defendant to relinquish firearms and other weapons when entering
50
the restraining order. Such statutes, however, generally grant the
judge the authority to order such “other relief” as the judge deems
51
necessary for the protection of the victim; ordering the defendant to
forfeit his or her weapons is logically within the realm of such “other
52
relief.” Other states explicitly grant the judge the permissive author53
ity to order the defendant to forfeit any weapons. Many of those
states permit such an order either if the court makes certain factual
54
findings or if the court considers a variety of factors. Other states
make forfeiture of firearms mandatory regardless of whether any reason exists to believe that the defendant would violate the restraining

49

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(b)(I) (LEXIS through Apr. 8, 2010).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Special
Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-13-4 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (Westlaw through 2009
Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Sess. of 49th Leg.);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).
51
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(c)(9) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Special Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-924(1)(g) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 101st Leg. 1st
Special Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through 2009
Reg. Sess.).
52
Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (authorizing the court to enter “other orders the court believes will be of assistance in eliminating future acts of domestic violence and abuse”), with United
States v. Calor, 172 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (recounting that the Kentucky state court ordered the defendant to forfeit his firearms under the emergency
protective order).
53
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(8) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-506(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.102(4)(g) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.022(b)(6)
(Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Reg, Sess. & 1st Called Sess. of 81st Leg.).
54
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(6), (7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg.
Sess. & 1st Special Sess. of 26th Leg.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A)
(Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of 124th Leg.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15201(2)(f) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(b)(3)
(West Supp. 2009).
50
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order and use the weapon against the plaintiff; one of these states is
55
New Jersey.
As discussed below, federal law moots the distinctions among the
states as to whether forfeiture of weapons by the restraining order is
56
prohibited, permissive, or even mandatory. Federal law prohibits
any person who is subject to a state restraining order from possessing
57
a firearm regardless of whether the order addresses the matter. The
lingering questions are whether such a blanket prohibition is justified
and, more importantly, whether it is constitutionally permissible.
C. New Jersey’s Restraining Orders
This Comment focuses on New Jersey’s domestic-violence statute
and analyzes it in light of an individual’s right to bear arms as protected by the Second Amendment. The law’s mandatory and overly
broad prohibitions on firearm ownership, in conjunction with the
laxity of the statute, infringe on defendants’ enumerated rights under
58
the Second Amendment.
Revision of the statute is necessary to
properly balance the constitutional rights of the defendant with the
interests of the plaintiff.
1.

Status of the Law

a.

General Provisions

The New Jersey Legislature passed the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991 to protect adults and emancipated minors from
59
domestic violence. To qualify for protection, a plaintiff must have
60
either a household or a dating relationship with the alleged abuser.
The statute specifies certain prohibited acts that, if committed by the
55

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005). Such mandatory provisions can be
found in other states as well. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (West 2004); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-27-502(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 4th Extraordinary
Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4m)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Act 99).
56
See infra Part II.C.2.b.
57
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).
58
See infra Part III.B.
59
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17, -18 (West 2005). For a discussion of various policy
issues surrounding this and other related statutes, see generally Melanie L. Mecka,
Note, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the Owning of Firearms by
Abusers, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 607 (1998).
60
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2005). An “emancipated minor” is someone under the age of eighteen who is either pregnant or has a child, is married, has
entered military service, or has been previously declared by a court or administrative
agency to be emancipated. § 2C:25-19(e).
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defendant, would warrant the protection of the courts. The statute
names fourteen predicate acts (all of which are codified as substantive crimes in New Jersey) that range from the more severe crimes of
homicide and sexual assault to the lesser crimes of terroristic threats,
62
lewdness, and harassment. These predicate offenses are intended to
aid the court in deciding whether the plaintiff was subject to “poten63
tial abusive and controlling behavior.”
Plaintiffs are entitled to seek ex parte relief from the courts in
64
the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Generally speaking, a court may enter such ex parte relief “when necessary to protect
65
the life, health or well-being of a victim.” If it “appears that the
plaintiff is in danger of domestic violence” and “good cause [is]
shown,” the court may issue a TRO that will remain in effect until the
66
court holds a further hearing. The TRO may prevent the defendant
from returning to the scene of the domestic violence (which often
means evicting the defendant from his home) and “may include . . .
forbidding the defendant from possessing any firearm or other wea67
pon.” The definition of “other weapon” is quite broad in New Jersey
law and thus allows the judge to prohibit the defendant from possess68
ing antique daggers, swords, or even household kitchen knives. The
issuance of a TRO is “immediately appealable” by the defendant for
69
de novo review, but because the standard is so low (i.e., whether it
70
“appears that the plaintiff is in danger of domestic violence”) such
an appeal is arguably of little practical value.
Within ten days of the issuance of the TRO, the court holds a
hearing to determine whether to extend the ex parte relief granted
71
by issuing a final restraining order (FRO). To grant an FRO, the
court must make a finding that the defendant has committed an act
of domestic violence—which would itself be a criminal act punishable
61

§ 2C:25-19(a).
Id.
63
Tribuzio v. Roder, 813 A.2d 1210, 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
64
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(f) (West 2005).
65
Id.
66
§ 2C:25-28(g), (i).
67
§ 2C:25-28(j).
68
Compare id. (defining “other weapon[s]” that the court may seize as those detailed in section 2C:39-1), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (liberally defining “weapon”).
69
§ 2C:25-28(i).
70
§ 2C:25-28(g) (emphasis added).
71
Id. § 2C:25-29(a).
62
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by law —or the defendant must admit committing such an act. Unlike criminal proceedings, where the state must prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff in the FRO hearing only need prove the allegations by the lesser standard of a “preponder74
75
ance of the evidence,” the lowest standard that the law provides.
Thus the court may find the defendant to have committed a criminal
act (which under this statute includes even murder) by the lower, civ76
il standard of proof. Interestingly, though, such a judicial finding of
the commission of a predicate crime is divorced from criminal proceedings, and the abuser is not subject to penal sanctions unless the
77
state files a separate indictment.
While the judge may remove the defendant’s weapons upon is78
suance of the TRO, the statute mandates that, upon the issuance of
an FRO, the judge order the defendant to forfeit all weapons as well
79
as any firearms-purchaser identification card. An exception exists
whereby law-enforcement officers and military personnel may be
80
permitted to carry weapons while on duty, but such exceptions are
greatly curtailed by a federal law that prohibits people subject to restraining orders from possessing weapons, as the federal law does not
81
provide these exceptions. In addition to the mandatory forfeiture of
firearms, the judge may also order the defendant to surrender all
knives, daggers, swords, bludgeons, slingshots, and even pepper spray

72

Id. § 2C:25-19(a).
§ 2C:25-29(a).
74
Id.
75
12 SUSAN REACH WINTERS & THOMAS D. BALDWIN, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE: FAMILY
LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 47.13 (1999) (stating that “preponderance of the
evidence” is the lowest evidential standard and thus below both “clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”).
76
Compare § 2C:25-19(a), with § 2C:25-29(a).
77
Cf. id. § 2C:25-28(a) (stating that the filing of a civil complaint for domestic
violence does not prevent the separate filing of a criminal complaint for the same
acts).
78
§ 2C:25-28(j).
79
Id. § 2C:25-29(b).
80
Id.
81
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006). In essence, then, a New Jersey restraining
order results in a mandatory change of duties (or possibly dismissal) of active service
personnel. Federal law does, however, permit the defendant to petition the Attorney
General for an exemption when the restrained person’s possession of a firearm
would not be contrary to public interest. Id. § 925(c).
73
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82

that the defendant may own. The FRO must withdraw the defendant’s gun rights (plus any other weapon rights that the judge chooses to curtail) for the greater of either two years or the duration of the
83
FRO; New Jersey restraining orders are presumptively unlimited in
84
duration.
In addition to the mandatory and permissive restrictions on a
defendant’s possession of weapons, a great many other remedies are
85
available to the plaintiff who prevails in the action. Not only will the
FRO prohibit defendant from committing acts of domestic violence
86
or otherwise contacting the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may also receive exclusive possession of the residence or household, and the
87
court may require the defendant to pay the rent or mortgage. The
court may limit the parenting time that the defendant may have with
88
the parties’ children. The judge may order the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for monetary losses suffered as a result of the do89
mestic violence. Furthermore, the court may require the defendant
to attend domestic-violence counseling and to pay personally for such
90
expenses. The court may even order the defendant to undergo psy91
chiatric evaluation. The list of remedies is expansive and tempting,
especially when considering that the plaintiff has the power to make a
92
soon-to-be “ex” miserable.
Once issued, an FRO is presumptively valid for the remainder of
the parties’ lives unless the judge placed an expiration date on the
93
order at the time of issuance. Either party may move to modify or
94
dissolve the FRO at any time, but the moving party must overcome a
82

Compare § 2C:25-29(b)(16) (defining “other weapon[s]” that may be seized as
those detailed in section 2C:39-1), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (defining “weapon” liberally).
83
§ 2C:25-29(b).
84
See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
85
See § 2C:25-29(b).
86
§ 2C:25-29(b)(1), (7).
87
§ 2C:25-29(b)(2), (8).
88
§ 2C:25-29(b)(3), (11).
89
§ 2C:25-29(b)(4).
90
§ 2C:25-29(b)(5).
91
§ 2C:25-29(b)(18).
92
See Cathy Young, Hitting Below the Belt, SALON.COM, Oct. 25, 1999,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/1999/10/25/restraining_orders/index.html.
Notably, New Jersey statute imposes mandatory fines on those against whom final restraining orders are issued. N.J STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.1 (West 2005).
93
See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
94
§ 2C:25-29(d).
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fairly substantial burden to succeed on such a motion. The motion
may only be heard by either (1) the same judge who originally issued
the FRO or (2) a judge who has a complete record of the hearing
95
upon which the order was based. Before the court even considers
having the order dissolved, the moving party bears the burden of
making a prima facie showing of good cause that the order should be
96
dissolved and must demonstrate “substantial changes in the circums97
tances” since the time of the issuance of the FRO. The court must
then “carefully scrutinize the record and carefully consider the totali98
ty of the circumstances” by weighing a series of factors to aid it in its
99
determination. Even when the plaintiff is the party requesting the
dissolution of the FRO, the court is not required to grant the mo100
tion. The court’s responsibility is “to protect victims,” and the court
will make its decision based on whether it feels that the victim re101
mains at risk of domestic violence. This standard for dissolving an
FRO is debatably more demanding than the standard by which such
an order is granted in the first instance, especially when other factors
102
are considered.
New Jersey’s statute additionally imposes certain record-keeping
requirements on the courts for all domestic-violence complaints, re103
gardless of whether an FRO issues.
The Administrative Office of
the Courts is required to maintain a uniform record of all domesticviolence complaints and TRO filings to generate periodic reports and
104
statistical data. Additionally, this office must keep a central registry
105
of all people with restraining orders filed against them. While the
106
information is confidential, the records cannot be expunged even if
the plaintiff drops the complaint and no criminal proceedings are
95

Id.
Id.
97
Kanaszka v. Kunen, 713 A.2d 565, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
98
Id. at 567.
99
Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 756–57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997)
(listing the eleven factors that the court should consider on a motion to dissolve a
restraining order).
100
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
101
Id.
102
See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the other factors that militate toward the granting of a restraining order).
103
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-33(a) (West 2005).
104
Id.
105
Id. § 2C:25-34.
106
§§ 2C:25-33, -34.
96
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107

filed. In essence, the once-alleged abuser (now exonerated) is forever on a list of domestic abusers. This branding is not limited to the
confines of New Jersey, however, as the federal government keeps its
own databases to identify those labeled as “abusers” anywhere in the
108
country.
b.

Specific Precedent

It is generally not difficult to obtain a restraining order against
one’s domestic partner in an abusive relationship. When a defendant
actually strikes or otherwise physically abuses the plaintiff, such acts
109
(sufficient for a conviction for assault) would certainly justify the
110
imposition of a restraining order.
Few would seriously argue that
restraining orders are anything less than clearly appropriate in cases
of physical violence. Whether to issue an FRO becomes less obvious,
however, where the defendant has not physically abused the plaintiff
but rather only used heated words or engaged in other nonviolent
acts: the law permits the issuance of an FRO on allegations of lewd111
ness, terroristic threats, and harassment.
Courts have properly issued FROs on a theory of harassment
against individuals who made phone calls with offensively coarse lan112
guage at inconvenient hours and mailed pornographic pictures of
the victim to a third party, implying that the pictures might be mailed
113
to the plaintiff’s workplace and son. Situations like these represent
cases where the defendant clearly sought to harass the plaintiff so as
to cause emotional harm. Thus the courts unsurprisingly issued
FROs based on these facts.
What is perhaps more revealing of the arguable ease with which
a plaintiff may receive a restraining order are cases where the trial
court issued an FRO that was later overturned by the appellate court.
In one such case, the defendant told his wife that he no longer loved
or desired her, and the judge issued an FRO on a theory of harass-

107
In re Expungement of the Criminal Record of M.D.Z., 668 A.2d 423, 425 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
108
See supra note 3.
109
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2005) (criminalizing assault).
110
Id. § 2C:25-19(a) (including assault among the predicate crimes for a finding
of domestic violence).
111
Id.
112
D.V. v. A.H., 926 A.2d 887, 888 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2007).
113
McGowan v. O’Rourke, 918 A.2d 716, 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
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114

ment.
In another situation, the defendant and the plaintiff were
115
having a heated argument, and the defendant slammed the door.
The defendant later moved all of the plaintiff’s personal possessions
out of the apartment into a storage locker in the plaintiff’s name, and
116
the trial judge deemed these acts sufficient for an FRO.
Another
judge issued a restraining order on a claim that the defendant’s method of disciplining the children differed from the plaintiff’s and
117
thereby caused the plaintiff injury.
Similarly, an FRO issued after
the defendant moved his wife’s desk out of the common office and
118
took the parties’ children to counseling instead of choir practice.
Yet another example is where the judge issued an FRO against the
defendant for harassment because he left a seemingly innocuous
119
note on his girlfriend’s car that asked her to “[p]lease page [him].”
In each of these cases, the trial judge issued an FRO that the ap120
pellate court later overturned. If, however, the defendants in these
cases lacked the time, the motivation, or the financial wherewithal to
appeal the determination, the restraining orders would have poten121
tially remained in effect for the rest of the parties’ joint lives and
thus permanently deprived the defendants of their constitutional
right to own weapons. An unadvisedly issued restraining order from
a lower court has far-reaching effects on the defendant’s liberties.
c.

Nonjudicial Proceedings

The issuance of restraining orders in judicial proceedings is not
the only way in which defendants may lose their firearm rights in New
Jersey. The statute itself permits police to seize weapons even without
122
a court order.
New Jersey’s statute states that upon responding to a scene of
domestic violence, law-enforcement officers are required to seize any
weapon that they believe would expose the victim to a risk of serious
114

Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
116
Id.
117
E.K. v. G.K., 575 A.2d 883, 884 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
118
L.D. v. W.D., 742 A.2d 588, 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
119
J.F. v. B.K., 706 A.2d 203, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (The note
stated, “Please page me 290-6512. I would like to talk to you. It’s a must. Thanks.”).
120
See sources cited supra notes 114–19.
121
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
122
Id. § 2C:25-21(d)(1)(b).
115
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123

bodily injury. The police may seize the alleged abuser’s weapons at
the request of the alleged victim even if the weapon was in no way re124
lated to the domestic-violence incident. In fact, county prosecutor
offices have been known to issue policy directives under which lawenforcement officers are instructed to inquire of the victim whether
the accused possesses any weapons; “[i]f so, the firearms should be
125
kept for safe keeping.” Upon petition by the county prosecutor to
prevent the return of weapons to the accused, the court must hold a
126
“summary” hearing to determine whether the weapons should be
retained pursuant to section 2C:58-3, which permits the court to deny
the return of seized weapons if it would not be in the interest of “pub127
lic health, safety or welfare.”
Courts are very unlikely to take seriously any argument claiming
that the protections of the Second Amendment are absolute. Even
the Supreme Court mentioned in the Heller decision (albeit in dicta)
that “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . , or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
128
commercial sale of arms.” But is New Jersey’s law, with its sweeping
and often mandatory restrictions on gun ownership, sufficiently
crafted to avoid infringing upon defendants’ Second Amendment
rights? The strict standards, when considered in conjunction with
the law in practice and the arguably widespread abuse in the system,
are overbroad and thereby infringe upon defendants’ Second
129
Amendment rights.
2.

Interaction with Other Laws

No law exists in a vacuum. To properly understand and then
correctly analyze the Second Amendment implications of New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, seeing how other laws interact with that statute at both the state and the federal levels is ne-

123

Id.
Hoffman v. Union County Prosecutor, 572 A.2d 1200, 1202 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1990).
125
Id. at 1200.
126
§ 2C:25-21(d)(3).
127
Id. § 2C:58-3(c)(5).
128
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
129
See infra Part III.B.
124
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cessary. Severe and oftentimes irrevocable collateral consequences
130
occur for those who have restraining orders filed against them.
a.

Additional New Jersey Statutes

Section 2C:58-3 of New Jersey’s statutes generally describes who
may purchase a firearm in the state, what sorts of identification one
must have, and what other procedures one must follow before obtain131
ing a firearm. No person who has been criminally convicted of an
act of domestic violence may receive a permit to purchase a wea132
pon. Similarly, no person who is subject to a restraining order may
obtain such a permit so long as the restraining order limits firearm
133
134
rights, and FROs are required to prohibit firearm ownership.
Even when the plaintiff drops a domestic-violence action, the court
still has the discretion to deny the return of the weapons to the defendant on the theory that the defendant’s possession of weapons
135
“would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare.”
Some commentators have argued that this roundabout provision has
the potential for abuse because a person initially accused in a possibly
frivolous action will be subject to a second judicial proceeding and
may consequently lose gun rights after having done nothing wrong in
136
the first instance.
A subprovision in this firearm statute is subsection 2C:583(c)(8), which states that a firearm-purchaser identification card shall
not be issued to “any person whose firearm is seized pursuant to the
‘Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991’ and whose firearm has
137
not been returned.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently interpreted this language to mean that satisfaction of any of the conditions annunciated in section 2C:25-21(d)(3) bars the court from re138
turning a gun permit to the defendant. Those conditions include a
130

See infra Part II.C.2.a–b.
§ 2C:58-3.
132
§ 2C:58-3(c)(1).
133
§ 2C:58-3(c)(6).
134
Id. § 2C:25-29(b).
135
§ 2C:58-3(c)(5); see In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 693 A.2d 92 (N.J. 1997).
136
Stacey Eisenberg, Recent Development, Criminal Law—Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act—Defendant Who Poses Threat to Public Health, Safety, or Welfare Is Not Entitled
to a Return of Firearms Even if Domestic Violence Complaint Against That Defendant Has
Been Dismissed: In the Matter of Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 693 A.2d
92 (1997), 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1710, 1715–16 (1997).
137
§ 2C:58-3(c)(8) (citations omitted).
138
M.S. v. Millburn Police Dep’t, 962 A.2d 515, 524 (N.J. 2008).
131
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showing by the prosecutor that the “owner is unfit or that the owner
poses a threat to the public in general or a person or persons in par139
ticular.”
Because restraining orders require the defendant to surrender any firearms, this particular provision generally applies only in
situations where the police seize the defendant’s guns upon responding to a domestic-violence complaint, where the plaintiff does not
seek a restraining order, and where the prosecutor later makes a mo140
tion to prevent the weapons from being returned to the defendant.
b.

Federal Statutes on Domestic Violence

The list of laws that interact with New Jersey’s domestic-violence
141
statute is not limited to state legislation. The federal government,
in another all too common extension of its power through the Commerce Clause, has also passed a series of statutes relating to domestic142
violence restraining orders. One such statute is 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261–
2266, which makes it a crime punishable in federal court to travel in
interstate commerce with the intent to commit an act of violence or
harassment in contravention of a state restraining order if the defendant actually engages in the prohibited conduct (i.e., assaults or ha143
rasses the protected person).
Because this particular provision is
conditioned not only on the existence of a valid restraining order but
also on the physical violation of the terms of the order by the com144
mission of a substantive crime, this law is vulnerable to comparatively less criticism. Other provisions, however, are perhaps not so unassailable.
A subsection of this particular statute requires that all states give
“full faith and credit” to every portion of a restraining order issued by
any state provided that certain minimum due process requirements
145
are met. Thus a state with very lax standards for issuing a restrain146
ing order may enter such a protective order, and every state and
139

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(d)(3) (West 2005).
Compare id. § 2C:25-29(b) (requiring the FRO to remove the defendant’s gun
rights), with id. § 2C:25-21(d)(3) (stating that weapons seized in accordance with the
Act “shall be returned to the owner except upon order of the Superior Court” and
granting the prosecutor the right to petition the court to obtain title to the firearms).
141
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 2261–2266 (2006).
142
See, e.g., id.
143
§ 2262(a)(1).
144
Id.
145
§ 2265(a).
146
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. &
5th Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)) (permitting a restraining order on a find140
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federal territory would be required to adhere to every provision, including any limitations on gun ownership.
The federal statute that generally restricts and defines firearm
ownership also addresses domestic-violence actions in a variety of
147
ways. That law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), makes it illegal for any person
to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to a person
who either has been convicted of an act of domestic violence or is
148
subject to a restraining order. Similarly, § 922(g)(9) prohibits anyone from possessing a firearm following conviction for a crime of
149
domestic violence. Because this latter section is a prohibition con150
ditioned on an actual criminal conviction, it is less vulnerable to attack because it reasonably relates to the general policy of keeping
firearms out of the hands of those who present a credible threat to
151
the safety of others. For that reason, courts that have examined the
152
constitutionality of this provision have found it to be valid.
Yet another federal prohibition relates to the employment of the
defendant. Under § 922(h), a person either subject to a restraining
order or convicted of a crime of domestic violence may not “receive,
possess, or transport any firearm or ammunition” through the course
153
of employment. This provision would clearly prohibit such an individual from working at a firearm retail store, a weapons manufactur154
ing facility, or a shooting range. Such prohibitions would seem reasonable enough in that those employment contexts are directly

ing that the defendant may commit an act of domestic violence). For a more detailed discussion of this particular statute, see supra Part II.B.
147
18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g), (h).
148
§ 922(d)(8), (9).
149
§ 922(g)(9).
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 14 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals with a history of
domestic violence should not have easy access to firearms.”).
152
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 236 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that
the statute does not violate the Second Amendment); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that such proscription does not violate
the Second Amendment but focusing on a militia right theory). For similar holdings, see also United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on a
militia-right theory); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999)
(same); Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 173 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C.
1999) (same). For post-Heller decisions upholding the constitutionality of this statute, see United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008); United States v.
White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala., Aug. 6, 2008).
153
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (2006).
154
See id.
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related to the use of firearms. But what about a professional truck
driver whose employer needs sealed crates of weapons delivered to a
customer? What about an employee of a large retail store (such as KMart or Walmart) that happens to have a sporting section that sells
hunting equipment—albeit in a section of the store where the employee is not assigned? And what about a server at an establishment
that keeps a firearm behind the bar? The employment implications
are potentially far-reaching and could easily be extended to any context where a firearm or ammunition may be either necessary or collaterally related. Arguably, denying people these sorts of job opportunities merely because they are subject to restraining orders that may
not even find that they pose a threat to the physical safety of the
plaintiff would be unreasonable. This particular provision casts the
net far wider than is reasonably necessary.
The last, and perhaps most troubling, federal law in this area is §
922(g)(8). This law prohibits anyone from possessing a firearm if
155
that person is subject to a state restraining order.
In theory, this
provision seems reasonable in that it prevents those who might
present a colorable threat to the safety of others from possessing a
156
dangerous weapon.
It is dependent, however, on the existence of
157
valid restraining orders issued by the states because no federal law
158
(except for the District of Columbia) authorizes the issuance of a
domestic-violence restraining order by a federal court. If a state
should issue an outrageous restraining order against a defendant,
then the federal law would operate where it may not have been in159
tended to do so.
With this in mind, Congress included a restriction whereby protective orders will be recognized for the purpose of this statute only if
(1) a hearing was held on the matter, (2) the defendant received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and (3) the order restrains the
defendant from engaging in conduct that would place a reasonable
160
person in fear of bodily injury.
Additionally, the state protective

155

§ 922(g)(8).
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 14 (1993).
157
§ 922(g)(8).
158
D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 3, 2010) (authorizing the issuance of domestic-violence restraining orders in the District of Columbia).
159
See, e.g., Hession, supra note 1, at 12–13 (describing a restraining order issued
against David Letterman for the protection of a woman whom he had never met on a
theory that his presence on television harassed her).
160
§ 922(g)(8).
156
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order must either include a finding that the defendant “represents a
161
credible threat to the physical safety” of the plaintiff or explicitly
162
prohibit the use or threat of physical force against the plaintiff.
Provided that a state meets these minimal burdens, the federal government will prevent the defendant from possessing a firearm even
where the state court did not find such a prohibition to be necessary
163
or otherwise justified.
Whether these procedural safeguards are
sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of defendants has led
164
courts to yield conflicted results.
Many of the federal courts that have upheld this particular provision under a Second Amendment analysis did so under the now
165
outdated “militia right” theory. One court stated in dicta that even
if an individual right to bear arms existed and strict scrutiny were to
apply, the statute would be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
166
governmental interest. That particular court, however, was dealing
with a restraining order of limited duration, unlike New Jersey’s or167
Some post-Heller cases
ders, which have no such expiration dates.
have also upheld the constitutionality of this federal statute, but they
often relied on restraining-order limitations that do not exist in New
168
Jersey’s FROs.
161

§ 922(g)(8)(C)(i).
§ 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
163
See § 922(g)(8).
164
See infra notes 167–75 and accompanying text.
165
See, e.g., United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2000).
166
United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004). For a similar
result, see United States v. Miles, 238 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301, 303 (D. Me. 2002), which
held that even if the Second Amendment protected a fundamental, individual right,
the statute would be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest because
it requires a finding that someone poses a threat of violence. In Miles, however, the
district court relied in part on a factual finding made by the state court that the defendant posed a threat of committing acts of violence. Id. at 302–03. This ruling is
thus limited because the federal statute requires either that (1) the person pose a
threat of violence or (2) the state restraining order prohibit the defendant from
committing an act of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006). Thus the federal
government possibly would deny someone the right to possess weapons based on a
restraining order that does not find that he poses a threat of violence. Rather, he
could simply be subject to a restraining order that prohibits him from committing
acts of violence.
167
Lippman, 369 F.3d at 1044; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL 667229, at *3–4
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (stating that no post-Heller decisions have found the statute
to be unconstitutional but focusing mainly on the fact that the indictment met the
162
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A district court in the Fifth Circuit analyzing this law reached a
different conclusion. The court in United States v. Emerson (a case
preceding Heller) first found that an individual right to bear arms ex169
isted. The court then found that because the federal law “allows a
state court divorce proceeding, without particularized findings of the
threat of future violence, to automatically deprive a citizen of his
Second Amendment rights,” this statute violated the defendant’s con170
stitutional rights.
“That such a routine civil order has such extensive consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes
171
the statute unconstitutional.”
Examining the case on appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
finding of an individual right to bear arms in the Second Amend172
ment but reversed the determination that the federal statute vi173
olated that right. The court noted that, even without specific findings, the state restraining order was constitutional because the
174
defendant received notice and a hearing. The court then found a
sufficient nexus between firearm possession by the defendant and the
threat of lawless violence to make constitutional such restrictions on
175
his Second Amendment rights.
But the mere presence of notice
and a hearing is arguably too low of a standard by which to deprive
the defendant of specifically enumerated rights. In some jurisdictions the hearing may be more akin to an administrative step in
176
which the defendant is presumed guilty.

requirements of the statute rather than discussing the unconstitutionality argument
raised by the defendant); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021–23
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding the statute constitutional but relying in part on the limited
duration of the state restraining order); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556,
2008 WL 4534058, at *2–3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding the statute “narrowly
crafted” to a “compelling governmental interest” but relying on the fact that the limitation is a “temporary prohibition”); United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224,
226–27 (D. Me. 2008) (finding that the statute was narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest although the case actually involved the making of false statements on an application to purchase firearms).
169
46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 611.
172
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
173
Id. at 265.
174
Id. at 262.
175
Id. at 264.
176
See infra Part II.C.3 for a discussion of this issue as it relates to New Jersey. See
also supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing states where the defendant
bears the burden of proving innocence).
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When New Jersey defendants have restraining orders filed
against them, the collateral consequences extend far beyond the specifics of those restrictions listed on the face of the orders. The defendants will lose their right to own any weapons and must turn over
177
any firearms that they may have owned in the past. If they are employed in any business where firearms or ammunition relate even
remotely to the operation of the business, they may either have to re178
179
sign or transfer lest they be subject to criminal prosecution. The
government places their names in a national database of domestic
180
181
abusers, and they are permanently stigmatized as “wife beaters.”
With all of these severe and oftentimes permanent collateral consequences, ensuring that every restraining order issued is justified and
not (as discussed in the next section) the product of an overzealous
court or an unscrupulous plaintiff abusing the system is all the more
182
important.
3.

Restraining Orders in Practice

“A litmus test of how vulnerable TROs are to abuse is how easy
183
they are to obtain.”
In perhaps no other area of the law is the
temptation for abuse quite as great as it is in domestic-violence ac184
tions. A plaintiff willing to exaggerate past incidents or even com-

177

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005).
See § 922(h).
179
See id. § 924(a) (setting forth applicable criminal penalties).
180
See supra note 3.
181
In re Expungement of the Criminal Record of M.D.Z., 668 A.2d 423, 425 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (stating that the defendant’s name need not be removed
from New Jersey’s register of domestic abusers even if no charges are filed and the
restraining order is later vacated).
182
See infra Part II.C.3.
183
Wendy McElroy, Abuse of Temporary Restraining Orders Endangers Real Victims,
Dec.
27,
2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/
FOXNEWS.COM,
0,2933,179842,00.html.
184
See David N. Heleniak, The New Star Chamber: The New Jersey Family Court and the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2005) (characterizing the potential for abuse as “tremendous”). See generally Scott A. Lerner, Combating
Orders-of-Protection Abuse in Divorce, 95 ILL. B.J. 590 (2007) (describing the temptation
for abuse by plaintiffs of the domestic-violence statutes of Illinois, which provide
much of the same relief as the divorce statutes but at a fraction of the time and with
lower burdens of proof); Charles E. Corry, Abuse of Protection Orders,
http://www.dvmen.org/dv-16.htm#restraint (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (stating that
“the law encourages the [plaintiff] to lie” and that “the temptation [for abuse] may
well be irresistible”).
178
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mit perjury can have access to a responsive support group, a sympa185
thetic court, and a litany of immediate relief.
The current situation of New Jersey restraining orders is perhaps
best understood by means of a hypothetical example. A New Jersey
couple has been married for a number of years, but their relationship
has taken a turn for the worse. The husband and wife have gradually
grown to dislike one another and frequently argue. One of the
spouses decides that they should divorce. After one final argument,
the husband leaves the house for a few hours. The wife wants him
out of her life immediately and thus goes to court and files a domestic-violence complaint. The theory could be one of harassment, and
she could simply embellish their last argument, or she could claim
that he threatened to hit her. The wife fills out a few forms, stands in
front of a judge very shortly afterwards, and obtains an ex parte re186
straining order against her husband that very same day.
The court has just evicted the husband from his home and declared that he will only be permitted to return to pick up a few per187
sonal belongings if a law-enforcement officer accompanies him.
Maybe the husband has the money to move into a motel for a few
days, or maybe he does not. The order says that within ten days a
hearing on the matter will be held before a judge to determine
188
whether to make the restraining order permanent.
Perhaps he
does not think to hire a lawyer, or perhaps he simply does not have
the money to pay for one. The police search his home and confiscate
his hunting rifles and his antique saber from the Civil War that had
189
been passed down in his family for generations.
In about a week, he shows up to court after living in a motel for
the past ten days (if he is lucky), and his wife formally accuses him of
190
being a domestic abuser. She claims that he threatened to hit her;
191
he denies the allegation. Because the standard of proof is very low

185

See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014; Young, supra note 92.
For a discussion of the exact procedure, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West
2005).
187
See § 2C:25-28(j), (k).
188
Continuances are sometimes allowed in the interest of “fundamental fairness.”
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 413 (N.J. 2003). Many husbands are no doubt unaware
of this option as not all men hire attorneys. See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014–15.
189
See § 2C:25-28(j) (authorizing the removal of other weapons in addition to
firearms).
190
See id. § 2C:25-29(a).
191
Id. (setting the standard as by a “preponderance of the evidence”).
186
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and because the judge is very cautious about denying the request for
192
fear that the plaintiff could be telling the truth, the judge issues a
final restraining order. The terms of the restraining order grant the
193
wife exclusive possession of the home and require the husband to
194
keep paying the mortgage. He is told that he can only see his child195
ren at designated times when a court-ordered supervisor is present.
The wife is permitted to have sole possession of the family car and
other personal property that she had petitioned from the court, in196
cluding the checkbook.
He is denied the return of his hunting
rifles and antique saber, and he is told that he might never be permit197
ted to purchase any other weapons for the rest of his life. And as a
final blow, the husband is told that he needs to undergo psychiatric
198
199
evaluation and attend domestic-violence counseling; the court
200
orders him to pay the counselor personally.
Advocate groups and commentators have been arguing for years
about the potential for abuse inherent within the domestic-violence
201
system. If a spouse is willing to fill out an inaccurate affidavit and
exaggerate past facts that, like an allegation of a verbal threat, may be
impossible to disprove, the spouse can gain the upper hand in a di-

192

For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 213–27 and accompanying text.
193
See § 2C:25-29(b)(2).
194
See § 2C:25-29(b)(8).
195
See § 2C:25-29(b)(3).
196
See § 2C:25-29(b)(9).
197
See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
198
See § 2C:25-29(b)(16).
199
See § 2C:25-29(b)(5).
200
See id.
201
See, e.g., RADAR SERVS., INC., WITHOUT RESTRAINT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
DOMESTIC RESTRAINING ORDERS 6, http://www.radarsvcs.org/docs/RADARreportVAWA-Restraining-Orders.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (stating that restraining orders are used as bargaining chips in divorce proceedings); Heleniak, supra note 184,
at 1014; Thomas J. Kasper, Obtaining and Defending Against an Order of Protection, 93
ILL. B.J. 290, 290 (2005), available at http://www.fathersunite.org/
Restraining%20Orders%20and%20Domestic%20Violence/RestrainingOrderIL.html
(stating that protection orders “can also become part of the gamesmanship of divorce”); Cathy Young, The Abuse of Restraining Orders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1999,
at A19 (stating that FROs are abused as a tactical advantage); Young, supra note 92;
Corry, supra note 184 (stating that FROs “have also been abused in divorces to keep
assets” and quoting the California bar as having expressed concern that “protective
orders are increasingly being used in family law cases to help one side jockey for an
advantage in child custody”). See generally Lerner, supra note 184 (describing cases of
abuse discussed by the Illinois appellate courts).
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vorce proceeding after years of planning while the other spouse will
202
have fewer than ten days to prepare for the hearing. Many practitioners in this field and defendants’ rights groups vehemently argue
203
that the law is abused, and some posit that restraining orders are
commonly used as leverage tools by pseudo-victims to seek financial
204
concessions in return for dropping the FRO.
Naturally, other scholars and advocate groups argue that allega205
tions of abuse of the system by plaintiffs are unfounded.
Reliable
206
data on the rate of actual abuse by plaintiffs is difficult to obtain,
and personal opinions by practitioners are subject to being tainted by
the individual’s predispositions. But while actual abuse is difficult to

202

See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014.
See, e.g., RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 9 (quoting Dorothy Wright, a
New Jersey attorney and former board member of a women’s shelter, as estimating
that forty to fifty percent of all restraining orders are requested “purely as a legal
maneuver”); Jeffrey M. Leving & Glenn Sacks, Electronic Tagging Device Bill Will Harm
Innocent Men, BUFFALO NEWS, May 30, 2007, at A6 (discussing the abuse of restraining
orders from the perspective of a family-law attorney); Mike McCormick & Glenn
Sacks, Restraining Orders Can Be Straitjackets on Justice, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), July 28,
2008, at 15 (“Anybody who practices family law sees people who abuse the restraining
order process. Some create false allegations or take minor insignificant acts and use
them to remove their spouse or partner from the home for advantage in litigation.
Such abuses undermine victims of real abuse and violence who seek protection.”); see
also Young, supra note 92.
204
See RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 6, 8 (stating that many restraining
orders are used for tactical advantages in litigation); Heleniak, supra note 184, at
1014; Kasper, supra note 201, at 290 (arguing that FROs have become “part of the
gamesmanship of divorce”); Young, supra note 92.
205
See McElroy, supra note 183 (stating that women’s groups maintain that the
abuse of TROs is rare); Paul Moreno, Groups Fight to End Abuse of Restraining Orders,
Most Mass. Media Ignore the Story: Cellucci and Feminists Want to Add to Existing Laws,
MASS. NEWS, June 23, 2000, http://www.massnews.com/past_issues/2000/10_Oct/
1009aw.htm (quoting an attorney from the Battered Women’s Legal Assistance
Project as having stated that “there is no evidence that restraining orders are commonly abused”); Young, supra note 92 (stating that some feminist activists claim that
restraining orders are abused by men rather than women).
206
Such “statistics” do exist in one form or another, however. For example, Professor Benjamin Foster, Ph.D., CPA, CMA, estimated that 80.6 percent of all of the
restraining orders issued in Virginia during 2006 were “false or unnecessary.” Hession, supra note 1, at 14; see also RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 9 (providing
that, as estimated by Dorothy Wright, a New Jersey attorney and former board member of a women’s shelter, forty to fifty percent of restraining orders are requested
“purely as a legal maneuver”); Young, supra note 92 (quoting Sheara Friend, a Massachusetts attorney, who estimates that forty to fifty percent of restraining orders are
strategic ploys). This Comment expresses no opinion about the trustworthiness of
such statistics.
203

SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

666

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

5/20/2010 4:56 PM

[Vol. 40:639

prove, the potential for abuse inherent in the system (as demonstrated
in the above discussion) is nonetheless undeniable.
Those who are contemplating a divorce face the possibility of extensive legal fees, months or even years of litigation, and an everpresent awareness that they may not walk away with everything they
wanted from the divorce. Many people simply do not have the money, time, patience, or moral fortitude to wait to follow the proper legal procedures of divorce. Furthermore, many divorce proceedings
are inherently hostile, and the adversarial environment might lead
someone to commit an illegal act (i.e., file an exaggerated or false petition) who normally would never have thought to do so. New Jersey’s domestic-violence law, much like every other such law in the
country, permits a person to circumvent the lengthy divorce procedures and obtain immediate relief on the same day she fills out the
207
application for protection.
Both men and women alike are subject to the temptation to
208
abuse the system—everyone is human and, as such, fallible. To argue that, despite the enormous opportunities presented to a wouldbe plaintiff, no one would choose to misuse the summary processes
afforded by the courts is at best naïve and at worst disingenuous.
Even avid pro-victim groups and feminists admit that abuse occurs,
but they argue that at most the rate is around five percent of all or209
ders issued. But even that low estimate (which, like many statistics,
is likely based on supposition) means that approximately 100,000 defendants nationwide have their liberties unjustly restricted by re210
straining orders every year.
“The highest purpose of law is not to
punish the guilty, but to protect the innocent. This must include
211
protecting the innocent from the law.”
The logical conclusion that at least some abuse is inherent within the system is undeniable, and it ignores the fundamental flaws of
207

See supra Part II.C.1.a (discussing the available relief and the applicable procedures).
208
See Young, supra note 201 (stating that men, just like women, have abused restraining orders).
209
Id. (quoting defenders of domestic-violence laws).
210
According to a recent news article, the Justice Department estimates that two
million restraining orders are issued each year. Leving & Sacks, supra note 203. Applying the conservative estimate of five percent to that number would mean that
100,000 people each year in the United States are subject to restraining-order abuse.
In New Jersey alone, 30,000 restraining orders are issued annually. McCormick &
Sacks, supra note 203. Five percent of that number is 1500.
211
Corry, supra note 184 (quoting Steven William Rimmer).

SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

5/20/2010 4:56 PM

COMMENT

667

humanity to argue otherwise. Thus the focal point of the remaining
debate between various groups should not be whether the abuse exists but rather at what rate the abuse of the system occurs. Even so,
abuse by unscrupulous plaintiffs is not the only reason for unease associated with the law. The legislature and the judiciary must also
bear their fair share of the responsibility for the current state of domestic-violence actions.
When a plaintiff alleges an act of domestic violence, some practitioners argue that the system essentially presumes the accused to be
guilty. One commentator argues that “[f]acts have become irrele212
vant” and that restraining orders are granted as a matter of course.
A plausible explanation for this possible phenomenon is the judge’s
213
own personal interest in being overly cautious.
If a judge should
grant a restraining order against someone who might not warrant it,
214
the only repercussion is that the defendant might appeal the order.
If, on the other hand, the judge denies a restraining order and the
plaintiff is killed or injured the very next day, sour publicity and an
enraged community may very well ensure that the jurist’s career will
215
be both unpleasant and short. New Jersey case law is full of examples of trial judges granting outrageous restraining orders based on

212

Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1018.
See Russ Bleemer, N.J. Judges Told to Ignore Rights in Abuse TROs, 140 N.J. L.J.
281, 295 (1995) (quoting a municipal court judge as having said that “[a] newspaper
headline can be death to a municipal court judge’s career . . . and the prospect of an
unfavorable newspaper headline is a frightening one.”).
214
The issuance of a TRO is immediately appealable for “plenary hearing de novo,” but the same standards would apply to the appellate review as were applied to
the initial hearing. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(i) (West 2005). FROs are appealable
in the same manner as any other order from a New Jersey trial judge. See N.J. CT. R.
2:2-3(a)(1) (2009).
215
See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295; Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1041.
213
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216

strained, if not ridiculous, allegations.
Other states have noted a
217
similar problem of lax standards.
This possible phenomenon is further explained and supplemented by the mandatory training that judges receive on the issue of
218
domestic violence.
At one such training session in 1995, the new
judges were told to think about the unfavorable publicity of an unfor219
tunate result when deciding whether to issue a TRO.
One of the
instructing judges at this particular session was quoted to have said,
“Your job is not to become concerned about all the constitutional
rights of the man you’re violating as you grant a restraining order.
Throw him out on the street, give him the clothes on his back and tell
220
him, ‘See ya’ around.’” Another judge stated, “If there is any doubt
in your mind about what to do, you should issue the restraining or221
der.”
These troubling sentiments are further compounded by the
222
fact that judges are trained to focus on the legislative findings,
223
which are very pro-plaintiff, when making their decisions.
These legislative findings declare that “domestic violence is a se224
rious crime against society” and that it is the “intent of the Legisla216

See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (granting a restraining order because the husband told his wife that he did not
love her and had no sexual feelings toward her); E.K. v. G.K., 575 A.2d 883, 884 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (granting a restraining order on a theory that the defendant’s methods of disciplining the parties’ children adversely impacted the plaintiff
because these methods differed from the plaintiff’s); Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319,
320–21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (issuing a restraining order based on the defendant’s acts of slamming a door during an argument with the plaintiff as well as
later placing the plaintiff’s possessions into a storage locker in her name); see also
Hession, supra note 1, at 12–13 (stating that a New Mexico judge issued a restraining
order against David Letterman on a theory that his presence on television harassed
the plaintiff).
217
See, e.g., Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1020. Examples include a Connecticut
attorney who argues that the state judges “approach protection orders as ‘a rubberstamping exercise’ and that the due process hearings held later ‘are usually a sham.’”
Id. Missouri has been accused of having similar problems. Id. Massachusetts is accused of giving the defendant “little credit.” Id. at 1019. See also Young, supra note 92
(discussing similar problems in multiple states).
218
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20(b)(2) (West 2005) (requiring judges to be
trained on domestic-violence issues within ninety days of appointment or transfer as
well as annually thereafter).
219
Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295.
220
Id. at 294.
221
Id. at 295.
222
Id. at 294.
223
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005).
224
Id.
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ture to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protec225
tion from abuse the law can provide.” The legislature stresses that
the primary duty of police officers is to “protect the victim” and simi226
larly that “it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims.”
Many courts cite this “maximum protection” language as a guiding
227
principle in their decision-making processes. These legislative findings and assigned purposes are not the last of the sources of troubling
laxity, however. The statute itself is another source of the potential
for abuse.
The standard for determining whether to grant a restraining or228
der is a preponderance of the evidence, the lowest standard availa229
ble in the law. This burden is applicable not only to violent crimes
230
of physical abuse but also to nonviolent crimes, such as harass231
In the past “harassment” has been the basis for over forty
ment.
232
percent of the allegations of abuse in New Jersey. Other states have
233
even higher rates. Trial judges have granted restraining orders on
very thin allegations of harassment, such as for one husband telling
his wife that he did not love her any longer and had no sexual feel234
ings for her, for another telling his wife that he would “bury” her if
235
she sold more marital assets, and for another threatening to take
“drastic measures” if she did not pay a bill and then subsequently cut-

225

Id.
Id.
227
See, e.g., Kanaszka v. Kunen, 713 A.2d 565, 567 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998);
M.V. v. J.R.G., 711 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), overruled on other
grounds by Kanaszka, 713 A.2d 565.
228
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005).
229
WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13.
230
For example, homicide, sexual assault, and assault are enumerated as predicate crimes. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (West 2005).
231
§ 2C:25-19(a)(13).
232
In 2007, allegations of harassment accounted for forty-two percent of all such
reported offenses. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING UNIT, N.J. STATE POLICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE OFFENSE REPORT 2 (2007), available at http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/
2007_domestic_violence.pdf (reporting that 30,055 of the 71,901 offenses in the state
were for alleged harassment).
233
For example, in Massachusetts the majority of restraining orders did not involve even an allegation of any physical abuse. Young, supra note 92. Many simply
state that there was yelling during the course of an argument. Id.
234
Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
235
Peranio v. Peranio, 654 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). The
court vacated the order because the phrase used in the specific context was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute harassment. Id.
226
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236

ting off her phone service.
The appellate division ultimately overturned each of these trial-level determinations and vacated the re237
straining orders issued below.
In so doing, the appellate courts limited the widespread use—and possible abuse—of “harassment” as
the means for obtaining restraining orders by altering the standards
238
for that theory.
The New Jersey Legislature, however, is currently
considering a bill that would even further expand the types of acts
239
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a restraining order, which
would thus perhaps render the appellate courts’ efforts moot.
Aside from the concerns already discussed, scholars and commentators have drawn attention to some other, ancillary issues in restraining orders. One author pointed out that the plight of defendants who work at home is yet another concern because a restraining
order not only evicts them from their homes but also greatly restricts,
240
if not destroys, their ability to work. Other commentators have argued that restraining orders inject comparatively more hostility and
conflict into domestic relations and thus have the effect of actually
241
increasing the commissions of domestic violence.
Some argue that
restraining orders do not even serve the limited purpose for which
they are intended because someone who is determined to kill his
spouse will likely not care that a judge ordered him not to do so, and
thus protective orders only serve to protect “victims” who were not in
242
any real danger in the first place. Some further claim that legislators advance restraining orders not for the sake of the victims but ra-

236
Corrente v. Corrente, 657 A.2d 440, 441 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
Note, however, that the New Jersey Legislature has proposed making cutting off telephone service grounds for a restraining order. Gen. Assem. A449, 214th Leg., 2010–
2011 Sess. (N.J. 2010).
237
Corrente, 657 A.2d at 444; Peranio, 654 A.2d at 500; Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d
984, 991–92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
238
For a discussion of this development in harassment as a theory for domestic
violence, see generally Tricia M. Lawrence, Note, The Domestic Violence Pendulum: Has
it Swung Too Far? Are Harassment Charges Now Being Used as a Sword Rather than a
Shield?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 342 (1998).
239
The New Jersey Legislature has proposed making a defendant who impairs the
plaintiff’s means of communication subject to a restraining order. Gen. Assem.
A449.
240
Hession, supra note 1, at 16.
241
David R. Usher, Restraining Orders Unconstitutional in New Jersey?,
OPEDNEWS.COM, July 25, 2008, http://www.opednews.com/articles/RestrainingOrders-Unconst-by-David-R--Usher-080725-854.html (stating that “the vast majority of
domestic violence occurs after issuance of a restraining order”).
242
Young, supra note 92.
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ther for the sake of a burgeoning, multibillion dollar domesticviolence industry, upon which countless attorneys, adoption service
employees, psychologists, therapists, and other related professionals
243
rely for their livelihood.
In sum, domestic-violence restraining orders are particularly susceptible to abuse by people who might fabricate allegations of domestic violence to gain an advantage in divorce proceedings. The legislative laxity of the statute, the temptation provided for unscrupulous
plaintiffs, the possible overzealousness of the courts, the legislative
purposes from the legislature, and the pressure from victim-advocate
groups stack up against defendants and threaten permanently to deprive them of their constitutional rights afforded by the Second
244
Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS OF NEW JERSEY’S STATUTE AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
The preceding portions of this Comment discussed how New
Jersey’s domestic-violence statute affects defendants’ firearm rights
both in isolation and in conjunction with numerous other laws. This
Part first concludes that the Supreme Court will likely adopt nothing
less than an intermediate-scrutiny level of review for Second Amend245
ment challenges.
Assuming and applying midlevel scrutiny as the
standard, New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act would
246
likely fail a challenge in the courts.
A. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny for Second Amendment Challenges
As is the case with all scrutiny of statutes under the U.S. Constitution, one of the first steps is to identify the level of review, because
the fate of such laws is normally dependent on the standard that the
247
courts apply. In the landmark case of Heller, however, the Supreme
Court explicitly declined to adopt a standard of review for Second
248
Amendment challenges. The language of the opinion does, never-

243

Usher, supra note 241; see also Hession, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that domestic violence has grown into a multibillion-dollar business in the past thirty years).
244
See infra Part III.B.
245
See infra Part III.A.
246
See infra Part III.B.
247
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671–72
(3d ed. 2006).
248
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817–18, 2821 (2008). The
Court noted that choosing a standard of review was unnecessary because under any
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theless, give some insight into how the Court might eventually rule
on this issue.
249
The majority noted that “rational basis” review is appropriate
250
for some instances of judicial review of constitutional issues, but
stated the following:
Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent
to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right,
be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. If
all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws,
251
and would have no effect.

Thus assuming that the Court will not choose rational basis as the
standard of review is appropriate.
Justice Breyer argued in his dissent that the Court should adopt
a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether
the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that
is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other impor252
tant governmental interests.” The majority in Heller specifically re253
jected this proposition as being “no constitutional guarantee at all.”
Undoubtedly, much scholarly debate and litigation will ensue after Heller, specifically on the appropriate standard of review. This
Comment will go no further, however, to dissect the positions of the
Justices on this issue and will not attempt to make a compelling case
as to why one particular standard of review should be chosen over
another. The Court has stated that both “rational basis” and an “interest-balancing inquiry” are not demanding enough. Consequently,
this Comment assumes that the Court will likely either fashion a new
test or will draw from preexisting doctrine to adopt a test somewhere

of the standards that it could apply to enumerated rights, the law at issue would fail
constitutional muster. Id. at 2817–18.
249
Under this standard of review, courts will uphold a law if it “bears a reasonable
relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (7th ed. 1999).
250
The Court stated that these instances include the constitutional command
against the enforcement of irrational laws. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.
251
Id. (citation omitted).
252
Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253
Id. at 2817–18, 2821 (majority opinion).
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between “intermediate scrutiny” and “strict scrutiny.”
This Comment concludes, however, that even if the Court ultimately chooses
the lower “intermediate-scrutiny” standard, New Jersey’s Prevention
of Domestic Violence Act violates defendants’ rights under the
255
Second Amendment because the Act is overly broad.
B. Analysis of New Jersey’s Statute under the Second Amendment
New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act has been criticized for some time. Many argue that such statutes are simply lacking
256
on policy grounds; others argue that they are constitutionally in257
firm. One of the more common objections is that New Jersey’s statute is actually a prosecution for a crime turned into a civil proceed258
ing.
And in fact, in a recent state case, Crespo v. Crespo, the trial
judge found the statute violative of both the state and federal consti259
tutions but not on Second Amendment grounds.

254

For a discussion of these various types of scrutiny, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
247, at 671–73. For a post-Heller case suggesting that strict scrutiny might be appropriate, see United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (“The individual right to bear arms might well be a fundamental right, the restriction of
which requires strict scrutiny. This conclusion is supported by the placement of the
Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights alongside this Country’s most precious
freedoms.”).
255
See infra Part III.B.
256
See, e.g., Sack, supra note 30, at 1676–1721 (describing in general various policyrelated discussions of domestic-violence statutes).
257
See, e.g., Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1042 (arguing that the statute has six deficiencies: “lack of notice; the denial of the right of poor defendants to free counsel;
the denial of the right to take the depositions; the lack of a full evidentiary hearing;
an improper standard of proof; and, most importantly, the failure to provide a defendant with a trial by jury”).
258
See, e.g., Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 7 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.
June
18,
2008),
available
at
http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/
crespo_decision.pdf (addressing the defendant’s arguments on this point), rev’d, 972
A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2009);
Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1009–10 (stating that New Jersey’s law attempts to convert the prosecution for a crime into a civil proceeding). Interestingly, the New Jersey Appellate Division at one point commented on the fact that the statute requires a
judge to make a judicial finding that the defendant committed a crime and that the
court must do so at a standard lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cesare v.
Cesare, 694 A.2d 603, 606–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998) (overturning the appellate decision on other
grounds and not addressing this particular issue).
259
Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, at 15, 19 (stating that the statute violated the separation-of-powers principle under the New Jersey Constitution and the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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The Supreme Court in Heller declared that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for
260
personal protection.
This right is not absolute, however, as the
261
Court noted. Convicted felons, for example, are roundly regarded
262
to have forfeited this right. But merely because someone is a party
in a divorce proceeding and has a soon-to-be-ex-spouse who chooses
to abuse the system, saying that this individual should lose all rights to
possess weapons, potentially for life, goes too far.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court were eventually to apply an “intermediate scrutiny” standard to Second
263
Amendment challenges, then the government would have to justify
the law by showing the existence of “important” governmental objectives and must meet a “demanding” burden of justification by showing that the law is “substantially related” to the achievement of those
264
objectives. New Jersey’s law, when viewed not only in isolation but
also in tandem with all of the collateral consequences that befall the
defendants the law ensnares, is clearly deficient in these regards.
The “important governmental objective” is the prevention of
265
domestic violence. Few would seriously argue that this is not justifi266
Where New Jersey’s law fails constitutional muster,
able as such.
however, is the second prong of the analysis: whether the law is “substantially related” to this objective.
The laxity of the statute is clearly egregious considering all that
the defendant stands to lose upon the issuance of an FRO. Many
practitioners argue that restraining orders are granted as a matter of
267
reflex in many instances.
First, at the ex parte hearing, the judge
need only be convinced that it “appears that the plaintiff is in danger
268
Many of the predicate crimes (e.g., harassof domestic violence.”

260

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
Id. at 2816–17.
262
Id. (assuming the validity of such “longstanding prohibitions”).
263
See supra Part III.A.
264
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 671; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining “intermediate scrutiny”).
265
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005) (“It is therefore, the intent of the
Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from
abuse the law can provide.”).
266
See id. (finding that domestic violence is a “serious crime against society”).
267
See supra Part II.C.3.
268
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(g) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
261
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269

ment and terroristic threats) are so easy to allege and difficult to
270
disprove that the burden on the plaintiff (who testifies without the
271
272
defendant being present) is virtually nonexistent. The plaintiff is
provided with many tempting reasons to embellish, if not completely
273
fabricate, the alleged abusive encounter.
Judges are trained and
encouraged to grant such restraining orders not only as a matter of
legislatively mandated public policy but also as a matter of personally
274
motivated interest in job security.
At this point, the defendant’s
275
weapons may be seized under the TRO.
276
Within an extremely short period of time (during which the
277
defendant has likely been evicted from his home) the defendant is
formally accused of being a domestic abuser by his estranged spouse
278
or partner.
While the plaintiff must technically meet the minimal
279
burden of a “preponderance of the evidence,” numerous commentators argue that the defendant is, as a matter of practice, presumed
280
281
to be guilty.
After a summary hearing, the court (erring on the
269

Id. § 2C:25-19(a).
See Lawrence, supra note 238, at 351 (discussing restraining orders based on
harassment allegations that were later overturned on appeal).
271
See § 2C:25-28 (permitting a temporary restraining order to be granted after an
ex parte hearing).
272
See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 294 (stating that judges are encouraged to
grant every order).
273
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (listing the relief available to the
plaintiff). Much of this relief permits the plaintiff to receive the benefits of a lengthy
divorce proceeding simply by alleging that the defendant threatened to physically
abuse her. See id.; see also Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1042.
274
See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295 (stating that some judges are motivated by
the desire to avoid bad publicity that might jeopardize their careers); supra Part
II.C.3.
275
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005).
276
Ten days is the return period for the hearing. Id. § 2C:25-29(a).
277
See § 2C:25-28(j) (permitting the judge to forbid the defendant “from returning to the scene of the domestic violence,” which oftentimes is the home).
278
See § 2C:25-29(a).
279
Id.
280
Elaine Epstein, former president of the Massachusetts Women’s Bar Association, stated, “The facts have become irrelevant . . . . Everyone knows that restraining
orders . . . are granted to virtually all who apply, lest anyone be blamed for an unfortunate result . . . .” Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1017–18 (quoting Young, supra note
92); see also Lerner, supra note 184, at 592 (“If a parent is willing to abuse the system,
it is unlikely the trial court could discover their improper motives in an order of protection hearing . . . .”); Hession, supra note 1, at 13 (“Courts routinely issue [temporary] orders on sworn statements like, ‘I just don’t know what he may do,’ or, ‘he has
a long history of verbal and emotional abuse.’ . . . To some judges, evidence is irrele270
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side of caution) judicially finds him to have committed a criminal
282
act, although no criminal charges have been filed against him and
283
no grand jury has issued an indictment. The judge is then required
284
to remove the defendant’s firearm rights even if no reason warrants
believing that the defendant might use physical violence against the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the court is under no obligation to place any
285
sort of time limit on the prohibition. Should the judge so choose,
the judge may not only order that the defendant be barred from owning a firearm but also that the defendant be barred from owning any
item that could be used as a weapon, including possibly family heir286
looms or kitchen knives.
New Jersey’s statute deprives defendants
of their specifically enumerated Second Amendment rights in a
summary manner, provides no exception for nonviolent defendants,
and presumes that the deprivation will last for the rest of the defendant’s life. As such, it is patently overbroad and constitutionally deficient.
To add insult to injury, even if the New Jersey Legislature were
to amend the statute to make the prohibition on gun ownership

vant; they just issue [final restraining] orders.”); Arnold H. Rutkin, From the Editor,
FAMILY ADVOCATE, Winter 1996, at ii, iii (stating that the issuance of a TRO is a “rubber-stamping exercise” and arguing that subsequent hearings “are usually a sham”);
Young, supra note 201 (stating that “judges who worry about being perceived as insensitive to women are satisfied with an affirmative reply to ‘Are you afraid of bodily
harm by the defendant?’” and quoting former Massachusetts state Representative
Barbara Gray as having said that “judges grant the restraining orders without asking
too many questions”).
281
Depos v. Depos, 704 A.2d 1049, 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (concluding that the hearings are summary in nature). These summary hearings are “short
and concise” and last only a few hours. Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1015. Judges
often make their determinations based on “hunches, gut feelings, intuition, and preconceived notions.” Id. at 1037. Notably, “prior bad acts” are admissible into evidence at these proceedings (in contravention of the normal evidentiary rules, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)), and no right to depose the opposing party before the hearing
exists. Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1037; see also Depos, 704 A.2d at 1051.
282
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005). Notably, however, some jurisdictions require only a finding that the individual may commit a crime, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E)(1) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 5th Special Sess. of the
49th Leg. (2009)), and thus seek to stop crimes before any criminal attempt is made.
See also Hession, supra note 1, at 13–16 (describing the consequences of restraining
orders).
283
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 2005).
284
§ 2C:25-29(b).
285
See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
286
Compare § 2C:25-29(b)(16) (granting the court the authority to order the removal of other “weapon[s]”), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (broadly defining “weapon”).
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merely permissive upon the issuance of an FRO, the Congress would
pick up where the state legislature left off with collateral federal consequences. Federal statutes prevent the defendant from purchasing
287
or possessing a weapon and from even working in an environment
288
in which a weapon may be minimally involved even though the de289
fendant may have no personal contact whatsoever with the weapon.
If the New Jersey court had granted an exemption to permit a police
officer or a member of the armed services to carry a firearm while on
duty, the federal government takes away that permission and thus
290
forces the defendant either to resign or transfer.
The trial court in Emerson found with regard to Texas’s restraining-order statute “[t]hat such a routine civil order has such extensive
consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes the
291
statute unconstitutional.”
Retroactive support for this proposition
comes from the Supreme Court in the closing paragraph of the majority opinion of Heller:
We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici
who believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution.
The Constitution leaves the [the legislature] a variety of tools for
combating that problem, including some measures regulating
handguns. But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
292
home.

While the Court here was speaking of absolute bans on all weapons
kept in the home for self-defense, an argument can be made that similar logic should apply with respect to a law that, in essence, denies
the right to armed self-defense to people whose estranged partners

287

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).
§ 922(h).
289
For examples of this sort of situation, see supra Part II.C.2.b.
290
See § 922(g)(8) (prohibiting persons with restraining orders filed against them
from possessing weapons and not providing an exception for police and military personnel).
291
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
292
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (citation omitted)
(second emphasis added).
288
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293

are using the “gamesmanship of divorce” to gain an upper hand in
separation proceedings.
Further compounding the laxity of the statute itself, the current
system in New Jersey provides tantalizing incentives for abuse by
294
plaintiffs to gain the upper hand in divorce proceedings.
According to numerous practitioners as well as simple logic, plaintiffs conse295
quently abuse the system.
Lax statutory standards and personally
motivated judicial bias militate toward the issuance of restraining or296
ders based on very thin and sometimes outrageous allegations. The
collateral consequences that befall the defendant extend far beyond
those restrictions listed on the face of the order and may very well
297
stay with the defendant for life. Among these are the stigma of being labeled a domestic abuser and having one’s name placed in a na298
tional database of registered offenders for an act for which no indictment was ever issued and on which no jury ever returned a guilty
verdict. Thus ensuring that every restraining order issued is fully justified is all the more imperative.
The law as currently written encourages false filings with the en299
ticing incentives available in the FRO.
The statute then places on
300
the plaintiff the most minimal burden that it can. Judicial training
and personal motivation encourage the judges to grant every order
301
lest they be blamed for making a mistake.
Upon granting the order, the defendant loses the right to bear arms, presumptively for
302
303
life. No exception is made for nonviolent defendants. For all of
these reasons, the law is patently unreasonable and overbroad.
Therefore, New Jersey’s statute is not “substantially related” to an
293

See Kasper, supra note 201, at 290 (stating that protective orders “can also become part of the gamesmanship of divorce”).
294
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (listing the remedies available to
plaintiffs).
295
See supra Part II.C.3.
296
Id.
297
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (2006) (prohibiting those with restraining orders
filed against them from coming into contact with weapons at their places of employment).
298
See supra note 3.
299
See supra Part II.C.3.
300
WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13. This is the burden placed on
plaintiffs in FRO hearings. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005).
301
See supra Part II.C.3.
302
See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
303
See § 2C:25-29(b).
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“important governmental interest” and thus violates the Second
Amendment.
In an intermediate-scrutiny analysis, the underinclusiveness and
304
overinclusiveness of the law is a factor in deciding constitutionality.
Numerous other ways exist to meet the societal goal of preventing
domestic violence that do not run such an incredible risk of ensnaring innocent defendants and depriving them of their Second
305
Amendment rights.
The fact that New Jersey could meet these
goals while still respecting the rights of defendants makes the current
provisions of the statute all the more unreasonable.
IV. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO NEW JERSEY’S STATUTE
The government’s goal of preventing domestic violence is certainly legitimate if not compelling. When abusive relationships actually exist, they are justifiably despicable and should be subject to
criminal prosecution, as with every other crime. Yet because the goal
is not only to punish acts of domestic violence but also to prevent
306
them, some further protection beyond mere prosecution for the
underlying crime is necessary to properly shield actual victims from
oppression. But New Jersey’s statute has gone too far and, in so
doing, has infringed on the Second Amendment rights of individual
307
defendants.
Substantial alternatives to the current law exist that
would properly balance not only the protection interests of the plaintiff but also the constitutional rights of the defendant.
One commentator passively suggests as a possible solution the
308
simple abolition of all civil restraining-order statutes. According to
that author, when a real need for a protective order exists (i.e., when
actual assault or threatened assault has occurred), the court likely will
issue a criminal restraining order after the filing of criminal
309
charges.
Nevertheless, complete abolition, while certainly administrable and straightforward, is somewhat extreme. Public sentiment
leans toward the provision of some form of extra protection—a fact
evidenced by the very existence of domestic-violence statutes not only
304

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 674.
See infra Part IV.
306
See § 2C:25-18 (“It is therefore, the intent of the Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.”).
307
See supra Part III.B.
308
Hession, supra note 1, at 17.
309
Id.
305
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in every single state but also at the federal level.
In fact, New Jersey’s statute specifically states that some form of additional legal pro311
tection is needed.
Direct abolition would be not only a legislative
task of herculean proportion but also perhaps an act of political suicide. Therefore, an alternative more reasonable than abolition is required. That alternative is modification.
A great many modifications are possible through which New Jersey’s statute could properly balance the Second Amendment rights of
the defendant with both the individual needs of the plaintiff for protection and the larger societal interests of discouraging the reprehensible behavior of domestic abuse. The first modification would be
to make the prohibition on firearm ownership after an FRO is issued
312
permissive as opposed to mandatory. After all, someone may be harassing or being lewd to the plaintiff (acts that would justify the impo313
sition of a restraining order) but all of the surrounding circumstances could possibly indicate that the plaintiff was not in any physical
danger from the defendant.
Alaska’s statute is illustrative of the proposition for conditional
removal of weapons. It provides that a court may order the defendant to surrender any firearms “if the court finds that the respondent
was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the commis314
sion of the domestic violence.” Many other states have similar provisions that grant courts the power to protect the plaintiff while simultaneously recognizing that the defendant has rights at stake as
315
well. To provide additional protection to potential victims, the law

310

See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 30 (listing all fifty
states’ restraining-order statutes along with the version enacted by the District of Columbia).
311
See § 2C:25-18 (stating that New Jersey’s law prior to the enactment of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was insufficient to deal with domestic violence).
312
See id. § 2C:25-29(b) (requiring the judge issuing the FRO to remove the defendant’s gun rights and providing a limited exception for law-enforcement officers
and military personnel).
313
See id. § 2C:25-19(a) (listing lewdness and harassment among the predicate offenses).
314
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st Special Sess. of 26th Leg.).
315
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(G)(4) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess.
& 5th Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)) (permitting the removal of weapons if
the court finds that the defendant poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the
plaintiff); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg.
Sess. of 124th Leg.) (permitting the removal of weapons if the incident of abuse involved a firearm or if a heightened risk of immediate abuse exists); MASS. GEN. LAWS
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could permit the courts to seize the weapons if the defendant specifically threatened to use the weapons against the plaintiff even though
the weapons were not in the defendant’s possession at the time of the
domestic-violence incident that gave rise to the complaint. Some requirement, no matter how slight, that the defendant pose a credible
threat of using a firearm against the plaintiff would keep weapons out
of the hands of defendants who legitimately threaten the safety of the
victim but would simultaneously permit nonviolent defendants to retain their constitutional rights. This modification is more reasonable
than a mandatory surrender of all weapons by every defendant regardless of whether any reason exists to believe that the defendant
might use a weapon against the plaintiff.
Opponents of this first revision would necessarily argue that all
people against whom restraining orders are issued should have their
316
weapons taken away. After all, the very existence of an FRO might
tend to indicate that a person is dangerous. That proposition, however, is overly broad and unnecessarily binds the courts’ hands from
dealing with defendants as individuals. The circumstances may very
well indicate that a defendant who has been lewd to the plaintiff or
has harassed the plaintiff with inappropriate phone calls (both of

ANN. ch. 209A, § 3B (West, Westlaw through ch. 19 of 2010 2d Annual Sess.) (conditioning the removal of firearms upon a showing of a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(j) (West, Westlaw through
2009 Reg. Sess.) (conditioning the removal of firearms upon a finding that the defendant subsequently violated the order while using a firearm); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-15-201(2)(f) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (permitting the removal of a
firearm used in the alleged assault); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.031 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 74th Reg. Sess. & 25th Special Sess.) (requiring the court to consider
three factors in deciding whether to remove the defendant’s weapons); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 842-a (McKinney, Westlaw through Laws of 2009) (providing a lengthy set of
conditions for the removal of firearms under varying conditions); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 50B-3.1(a) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (conditioning the removal of
firearms upon the finding of any of four factors); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(b)
(West Supp. 2009) (permitting the removal of firearms if either the abuse involved a
weapon or an immediate and present danger of abuse exists); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-7-106(2)(d) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Special Sess.) (permitting the court to
remove the defendant’s weapons if his or her use or possession of firearms may pose
a serious threat of harm to the victim).
316
See, e.g., Editorial, Armed and Dangerous; Domestic Abuse Suspects Shouldn’t Be Able
to Keep Their Guns, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/
AR2009021601103.html (arguing that Maryland restraining-order suspects should be
stripped of their gun rights).

SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

682

5/20/2010 4:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:639

317

which would warrant a protective order) poses no credible threat to
the physical safety of the plaintiff.
By analogy, if the logic were to prevail that people with restraining orders against them should be prohibited from possessing firearms under any circumstances because they are inherently dangerous, then surely all those actually convicted of crimes should
therefore have their gun rights taken away. After all, those people
have, by definition, either pled guilty to a crime or have been found
guilty by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard far more de318
manding than a mere preponderance of the evidence.
But the law
does not deprive all people with criminal convictions from possessing
weapons. Federal law, for example, permits those with misdemeanor
convictions or even certain felony convictions (e.g., “business practic319
es” crimes) to possess weapons. At the very core of that permission
is the implicit recognition that not all convicted criminals pose a
threat to the physical safety of others. Similar logic should apply to
those with restraining orders filed against them. The argument that
all domestic-violence defendants are inherently dangerous is overly
broad, fatally simplistic, and unduly restrictive and thus gives the
court no discretion on decisions that affect the constitutional rights
of defendants.
The second modification would be to place a presumptive time
limit on FROs. Virtually every state in the country places such time
320
321
limits on their orders, but New Jersey does not. The result is that
317
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (West 2005) (listing lewdness and harassment
among the predicate offenses).
318
Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “preponderance of the evidence,” the standard used in civil proceedings), with id. at 1272–73
(defining “reasonable doubt,” the standard used in criminal proceedings).
319
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (prohibiting firearm ownership by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison), with id. §
921(a)(20) (excluding from the definition of § 922(g)(1) predicate offenses that relate to “business practices”). Thus people convicted of misdemeanor offenses or
business felonies may still possess firearms under federal law.
320
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1) (LEXIS through 2009) (limiting the
order to one year); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st
Special Sess.) (providing for a presumptive limit of two years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-153(h)(2) (LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.) (limiting duration of the order
to three years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.)
(placing a one-year limit on the extension of the temporary protective order); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.) (placing a one-year limit
on the protective order); see also sources cited supra note 36.
321
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).
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if either party wishes to vacate the outstanding order, he or she will
322
likely need to hire an attorney and then must attend a hearing,
even though perhaps decades have passed without incident between
the parties. This modification would not only free up the courts and
reduce the legal expenses of the parties but would also place a cap on
how long a defendant may be deprived of Second Amendment rights
and thus bring the statute closer to the realm of being a reasonable
restriction on such liberties. Support for this amendment additionally derives from post-Heller decisions that, in finding certain restraining-order statutes constitutional, have relied in part on the existence
323
of such time limits.
A counterargument that opponents to this amendment will likely raise is that the defendant might still pose a threat to the plaintiff
even after the restraining order expires. That concern is easily addressed by permitting the court to extend the restraining order after
its expiration provided that the court finds that such a threat continues to exist. Most states that place time limits on restraining orders
324
grant the court such authority.
This amendment thus would continue to protect victims just as effectively but would place a presumptive limit on how long a defendant may be deprived of constitutional
rights, which would again make the statute more reasonable.
Third, the standard of proof should be raised above that of a
325
mere “preponderance of the evidence,” the lowest standard of

322

§ 2C:25-29(d).
See, e.g., United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (E.D. Wis. 2008)
(taking into account the time limit on the restraining order in finding that the federal government’s restriction on the defendant’s gun rights based on a Wisconsin
restraining order was constitutional); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556, 2008
WL 4534058, at *2–3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding the statute “narrowly crafted”
to a “compelling governmental interest” and relying in part on the fact that the limitation is a “temporary prohibition”).
324
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (permitting the court to renew the restraining order if the threat of domestic abuse still
exists); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009) (permitting the court to extend the order when necessary); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
60/220(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.) (permitting the
extension of the restraining order upon the satisfaction of certain conditions); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (permitting the
court to extend the order if any of four conditions are met); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
173-B:5(VI) (Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.) (permitting extensions
for “good cause”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.)
(allowing for extensions “on proper showing of cause”).
325
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005) (allocating to the plaintiff the
burden of proving his or her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence).
323
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326

proof that exists in the judicial system. The trial court in Crespo decided that the standard should be higher because the right to see
one’s family is a “fundamental right” that should not be deprived on
327
the basis of a “preponderance of the evidence.” The right to bear
arms is arguably even more fundamental than the right to see one’s
family because it is specifically protected in the Bill of Rights. Thus
the same logic (i.e., apply a higher level of proof before taking away
the right) should apply to it as to other such rights. Post-Heller deci328
sions provide support for this proposition.
This higher standard
would reduce the risk of defendants falling prey to unscrupulous
plaintiffs and overzealous courts but is still not so high that plaintiffs
will find it insurmountable.
Opposition to this third amendment is likely to be fierce. The
prevailing argument among victims’-rights advocates is that accusations of abuse are inherently difficult to prove (or perhaps to disprove, as the case may be), especially when no physical violence is
329
present. To require victims to prove their allegations by a standard
higher than the lowest allowed by law would be to run the risk that
true victims would be unable to meet this burden and thus would be
330
denied necessary relief.
Although that is certainly a legitimate argument, it does seem to patently ignore the interests of the defendant. But another option is available to a legislature that remains
concerned about victims’ abilities to prove their allegations: apply the
lower standard of “preponderance of the evidence” to portions of the
plaintiff’s allegations that would not deprive the defendant of fundamental rights (i.e., virtually everything in the petition), and apply
the higher standard of “clear and convincing evidence” to the consideration of whether the defendant should have any weapons taken
331
away. This alternative revision would permit the plaintiff to obtain
326

WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13.
Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 17, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
June 18, 2008), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/crespo_decision.pdf,
rev’d, 972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2009).
328
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008).
329
See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (expressing these concerns).
330
Id.
331
See supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text (proposing that the legislature
set forth a list of factors to satisfy the court that the defendant poses a danger of using weapons against the plaintiff before the court orders the defendant to forfeit his
or her firearms).
327
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the majority of relief requested and would only place a higher burden on the plaintiff if the plaintiff additionally wished to have the
court take away the defendant’s guns.
Arguments that this standard would be difficult to administer are
weak because the court surely has the institutional competence to distinguish between the two standards and because a separate finding by
the judge that the possession of weapons by the defendant poses a
threat to the plaintiff already requires independent consideration.
Thus, in actuality, this modification would place no extra burden on
the court that would not already exist by the adoption of the first
proposed amendment (i.e., making the removal of weapons conditional on the finding of certain facts). Such a modification is reasonable in that it only places an extra onus on plaintiffs who wish to curtail the constitutional rights of the defendant but simultaneously
prevents the courts from depriving the defendant of Second
Amendment firearm rights by the lowest standard available in the
law.
The fourth alteration would be to combat the temptation for
abuse by plaintiffs specifically by providing for penalties for false accusations by either party within the text of the statute. Many states
332
already outline such penalties in their domestic-violence laws.
While New Jersey already has a general prohibition on perjury among
333
its other substantive crimes, independent prosecution in relation to
334
domestic-violence complaints is rare.
By providing for specific pe332

For states that expressly give the court the authority to assess costs and fees
against a party making false statements, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15202(c)(2) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/226 (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.1(B)
(Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.1 (LEXIS through
2009 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(C)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch.
460 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of 52nd Leg.). For a statute that grants the court authority
to place such individuals in contempt of court, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2950(24) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.). For states that make false
statements punishable as crimes, see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(I) (Westlaw
through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a.1) (West
2001 & Supp. 2009).
333
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(a) (West 2005) (providing that the making of false
statements under oath is a crime of the third degree).
334
See generally Aisling Swift, Collier Courts Consider Perjury Charges for Use of False
Names, NAPLESNEWS.COM, June 30, 2007, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2007/
jun/30/special_report_collier
_courts_consider_perjury_cha/ (stating that perjury charges are rare in a variety of
proceedings); Valerie D. Nixon, Perjury: A Very Serious Crime?, TRUTH AND JUSTICE:
FAMILY COURT REFORM, Oct. 3, 2006, http://truthinscotsthistle.blogspot.com/
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nalties outside of criminal prosecution (such as monetary sanctions
by the court) and by making the parties aware of the consequences
before the proceeding, a judge (convinced that a particular plaintiff
is abusing the system) will far more likely actually sanction the individual attempting to misuse the judicial process. Allowing courts to
sanction either of the parties with monetary fines at the hearings will
decrease the likelihood that unscrupulous plaintiffs (or defendants,
for that matter) will go unchecked by the system. Furthermore, the
specific knowledge that one could be penalized for a fraudulent filing
will not only reduce the number of possibly frivolous petitions and
thus relieve congestion in the courts but will also reduce the risk of
false testimony at the hearings and thereby serve the fundamental interests of truth and justice.
Any opposition to this amendment would be on very shaky
ground in that it would seek to protect those who are abusing the
judicial system—thereby detracting time and resources that could be
spent on true victims—and improperly curtailing the liberties of innocent defendants. Furthermore, permitting the court to issue sanctions against any perjuring party results in an evenhanded application
of the law. Granting the court the authority to deal with what it finds
to be fraudulent filings with immediate monetary sanctions is certainly reasonable to curtail the temptation for abuse of the system by either party. Because it would concomitantly reduce the temptation
for abuse by plaintiffs, it would thus limit the number of possibly innocent defendants affected by the system and make the statute more
reasonable.
335
Finally, the mandatory yearly training of judges should be
modified to bring the constitutional rights of the defendant to the direct consideration of the court. Judges should not only be aware that
domestic violence is a societal problem and that they are to provide
336
the “maximum protection” to victims that the law can provide, but

2006_10_01_archive.html (expressing the opinion that perjury in family court often
goes unaddressed). Additionally, common sense indicates that many judges would
honestly believe that a party has lied under oath (or perhaps simply exaggerated the
truth) based on all of the facts and circumstances but would choose not to take the
extra step of attempting to bring the declarant up on criminal charges. The circumstances may be sufficient to convince a court of equity of malfeasance but would be
insufficient for the return of an indictment, let alone an ultimate conviction.
335
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20(a)(2) (West 2005) (mandating judicial training
on domestic-violence issues both within ninety days of appointment or transfer and
annually thereafter).
336
For a discussion of the training required for judges, see supra Part II.C.3.
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that they must also be wary of trampling on the constitutional rights
337
of defendants. Additionally, judges should be aware that the system
has a great potential for abuse and that plaintiffs are provided with
many incentives to be overly zealous if not unscrupulous in their peti338
tions for protection.
Addressing such concerns during judicial
training is certainly reasonable in an effort to balance the needs of
the plaintiff with the rights of the defendant. Counterarguments to
this proposed amendment would, in essence, insist that the court only hear the interests of one side and ignore the other. Such a position is clearly not in line with the interests of equity and justice.
Notably, however, even if the New Jersey Legislature were to
adopt all of the aforementioned suggestions for modification, defendants against whom restraining orders are issued would still be sub339
ject to federal curtailment of their gun rights. A state’s proper protection of the defendant’s constitutional rights is worthless if the
federal government immediately takes away that protection. Consequently, courts and commentators should analyze the federal prohibition on firearm ownership by those with restraining orders filed
against them to find the proper balance of all of the competing interests.
One possible solution is to make such restrictions on firearms
ownership conditioned on factors similar to those in Alaska’s legisla340
tion or perhaps to provide exceptions for nonviolent defendants.
Indeed, prohibition on gun ownership by felons under § 922 explicitly provides for a “business crimes” exception and thus permits people
341
with such nonviolent criminal histories to own firearms.
After all,
possession of weapons by those defendants is not the harm that the
statute is designed to prevent (i.e., keeping guns out of the hands of
dangerous individuals). Perhaps in the same spirit, analogous exceptions are appropriate where the person against whom a restraining
order is filed does not represent the danger targeted by the statute
337

See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 294–95 (noting that some judges have already
expressed concern about the short shrift that is given to defendants’ constitutional
rights in such hearings).
338
For a discussion of abuse by plaintiffs and such temptations, see supra Part
II.C.3.
339
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006) (prohibiting persons with restraining orders
filed against them from possessing firearms).
340
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st
Special Sess. of 26th Leg.) (defining the conditions under which a court may order
defendants to surrender their firearms).
341
See supra note 319.
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(i.e., does not pose a threat of using weapons against the plaintiff).
Whatever the case, the blanket prohibition of the federal law likely
342
goes too far, an observation already made by district courts.
Fur343
ther analysis is clearly appropriate in light of Heller.
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a legitimate societal concern that no one
should trivialize. When it occurs, the appropriate response is to take
it seriously and use the tools afforded by the legislature and the judicial system to correct past incidents and prevent recurrences. The
current New Jersey statute, however, is arranged in such a way that it
344
provides an enormous incentive for plaintiffs to abuse the process.
The abuse of civil protection orders not only trivializes the plight of
true victims of domestic violence, but it also subjects innocent defendants to unwarranted deprivations of their liberties and rights.
345
Among these lost liberties is the right to possess firearms.
The Supreme Court has dramatically altered the understanding
of the Second Amendment, and a constitutionally protected right for
346
the individual to keep and bear arms now exists. Incorporation of
347
this right against the states is not only reasonable but inevitable.
When this right is applied against the states, many laws will come under scrutiny in an area where they had previously been shielded from
any judicial review. Domestic-violence statutes are a prime example
of laws that affect in a sweeping manner the right of individuals to
possess guns, and Second Amendment challenges are certain to fol342

See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(declaring the federal statute as violative of the Second Amendment), rev’d, 270 F.3d
203 (5th Cir. 2001). For post-Heller decisions discussing the issue, see United States v.
Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021–24 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding constitutional the
federal gun prohibitions on those subject to restraining orders but relying in part on
the existence of the limited duration of the state restraining order); United States v.
Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (D. Me. 2008) (declaring constitutional the federal
prohibition on those subject to restraining orders from possessing firearms but dealing with the subject in the light of false statements by the defendant in trying to purchase a firearm); United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008) (finding constitutional the federal law prohibiting those with
domestic-violence convictions from possessing weapons).
343
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
344
See supra Part II.C.3.
345
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (requiring the court to remove
the defendant’s weapons upon issuing an FRO).
346
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
347
See supra Part II.A.
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low. New Jersey’s law in particular is overly broad and violates defendants’ Second Amendment rights by virtue of the laxity of the statute,
the temptation for abuse by plaintiffs, and the overzealousness of the
courts. Overreaction to a legitimate societal concern does not warrant the de facto extinction of an enumerated constitutional right.
The New Jersey Legislature should amend the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. Other states and the federal government should follow suit.

